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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 




A new trial is required in this case where the prosecutor used a peremptory 
challenge in violation of Equal Protection. A prima facie showing of discrimination was 
made and the State waived any challenge to that showing. The prosecutor's failure to 
state a race neutral reason to rebut that prima showing requires reversal, and even if the 
explanation were race neutral, the record demonstrates that the peremptory was exercised 
in a discriminatory fashion. This issue can be reviewed because it was preserved during a 
sidebar held prior to the jury being sworn or the venire dismissed, but it can also be 
reviewed for plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
POINT I. THE STATE'S PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE VIOLATED 
EQUAL PROTECTION. 
Harris's Batson1 objection was meritorious. The first step, which requires a prima 
facie showing of discrimination, was met where the State used a peremptory to challenge 
1
 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
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the only member of a racial minority in this racially charged case, the State did not 
challenge the sufficiency of Harris's prima facie case, and the judge required the State to 
justify its reason for striking the juror. See Appellant's Brief (A.B.):11-13. Additionally, 
the facts show an Equal Protection violation since the State's rationale for the strike was 
inherently discriminatory and did not satisfy the test for a racially neutral explanation 
under the second step. See A.B.: 13-25. The third step of the Batson inquiry also shows 
that the peremptory challenge violated Equal Protection since the State's explanation for 
the demeanor-based strike was not convincing and the circumstances, establish 
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge. 
A. The State agrees that Harris met the prima facie showing requirement. 
The State agrees that Harris met step 1 because the trial court required it to explain 
its strike and the State offered an explanation without challenging the prima facie case. 
State's brief (S.B.):30-31. Despite the fact that the State recognized below that a prima 
facie showing was made and waived any challenge to that showing, the State now 
attempts to dilute its concession by arguing, without any analysis or support, that the 
prima facie showing was weak. S.B.:30-31. Contrary to this claim, Harris made a strong 
prima facie showing where the State used its peremptory to challenge "the only minority 
on the jury [panel]" in this case involving racial slurs and claims by a white woman 
against an African-American man. R224:32 {See Addendum A to this reply brief2); see 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (stating standards for establishing prima facie showing); State v. 
2
 Addendum A contains the transcript of the voir dire (R224:l-22), the article the judge 
read to the jury (R224:22-28), the sidebar (R224:28-29), the subsequent on the record 
discussion (R224:30-31) and the juror sheet from the pleadings file (R158-59). 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Alverez, 872 P.2d 450, 457 (Utah 1994) (same); State v. Colwell 2000 UT 8, TJ18, 994 
P.2d 177 (same). The State's decision below to not challenge Harris's prima facie 
showing is consistent with case law and demonstrates the strength of that showing since 
the State struck the only member of a minority group when it knew very little about him 
in a case that involved racial slurs by a key state witness. 
Additionally, the State's argument that despite its concession below, "weakness in 
prima facie showing may [now] be considered in evaluating the trial court's ultimate 
denial of the Batson objection" is not supported by the cases it cites. See S.B.:31. 
Hernandez v. New York lists several considerations, none of which are a weak prima facie 
showing, as factors that supported the trial court's ruling that the government had not 
engaged in discrimination. 500 U.S. 352, 369-70 (1991). Colwell also does not stand for 
the State's proposition, but instead merely recognizes that striking a minority member 
alone is not enough to establish a prima facie case, indicating that "the issue of whether a 
prima facie case was established" was waived when the prosecutor failed to challenge the 
sufficiency of the prima facie case." Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^ [18. Hence, neither of the 
State's cases support its argument, and the record, case law, and State's concession 
establish that step 1 was met, requiring a race neutral explanation from the prosecutor. 
B. The prosecutor's explanation was not race neutral since discriminatory intent 
was inherent in the stated reason. 
The second step requires more than a superficial consideration of the words 
chosen by the prosecutor, and instead requires an assessment of whether the reason given 
for the strike is inherently discriminatory in nature. See id. at ^ [19; State v. Chatwin, 2002 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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UT App 363, f7, 58 P.3d 867. The reason for exercising the strike must be (1) neutral, (2) 
related to the case being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate. 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, ^ |22 (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Cantu, 778 
P.2d 517, 518-19 (Utah 1989) (Cantu II) (adopting factors to be considered at step 2); 
State v. Span, 819 P.2d 329, 342 (Utah 1991) (reiterating factors outlined in Cantu IITor 
assessing whether strike was race neutral); Coulter v. Gilmore, 155 F.3d 912, 921 (7th 
Cir 1998) (indicating government's explanation must include legitimate reasons that are 
clear, specific, and related to the case). And, the explanation cannot be "peculiar to any 
race." State v. Merrill, 928 P.2d 401, 403 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (quotations and citations 
omitted). If the explanation does not meet all of these requirements, it is not considered 
race neutral, and a new trial is required. Cantu II, 11% P.2d at 518. 
In Cantu II, the prosecutor's reason for his strike of a Hispanic juror was not 
racially neutral. There, the prosecutor struck a Hispanic juror because he was "angry at 
defense counsel" for insisting that the juror be included on the panel. Id. at 519. This 
Court emphasized that to be facially neutral, the explanation for the strike must relate to 
the case or the juror and be specific and legitimate. Id. 'The prosecutor's desultory voir 
dire, uninvolved demeanor, and failure to pursue a studied or deliberate course of 
questioning regarding specific bias, together with his stated reasons that the challenge 
was made in anger," showed that the reason was not related to the case. Id. Nor was the 
reason legitimate. Id. This Court held that the explanation was not racially neutral and 
violated Equal Protection, requiring a new trial. Id. 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Demeanor-based reasons are not always legitimate and "may well mask a race-
based strike." Davis v. Fisk Elect. Co., 268 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Tex. 2008); see A.B/.13-15. 
Because of this, such challenges must be "sufficiently specific to provide a basis upon 
which to evaluate their legitimacy." Brown v. Kelly, 973 F.2d 116, 121 (2nd Cir. 1992). 
Given the potential for abuse and use of demeanor-based challenges as a pretext for race 
based strikes, demeanor-based explanations "deserve[] particularly careful scrutiny." 
Brown, 973 F.2d at 121; see Hill v. State, 827 S.W.2d 860, 869 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) 
(holding demeanor-based explanation was not race neutral). 
Disinterest, inattentiveness, or failure to listen are all demeanor-based, subjective 
assessments that require close scrutiny "because such perceptions may easily be used as a 
pretext for discrimination." Mack v. Anderson, 861 N.E.2d 280, 296 (111. Ct. App. 2006) 
(citations omitted). Unless the record otherwise supports the explanation and the 
proponent of the strike gives clear, specific, and legitimate details to back up the claims 
of inattentiveness, these types of demeanor-based explanations fail to withstand scrutiny 
and are rejected as failing to establish a race neutral reason for the strike. Id. at 296-97. 
The prosecutor's demeanor-based explanation here was not neutral, related to the 
case, clear and reasonably specific, or legitimate. See Colwell, 2000 UT 8, Tf22. First, the 
explanation was speculative, subjective, and tied to race. The prosecutor claimed that she 
struck Juror 3 because he looked down and appeared inattentive, but looking away or 
down has different meanings in different cultures, and this type of explanation can easily 
be used as a pretext, demonstrating that the explanation is not reasonably specific or 
legitimate so as to be racially neutral. See A.B.: 15-19. 
5 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Additionally, the prosecutor's explanation did not contain the type of specificity 
and details necessary to demonstrate that the challenge was racially neutral. The 
prosecutor said repeatedly during her brief explanation that the juror was not paying 
attention, not listening, and "kept looking at her funny" as the judge read an article to the 
jury. R224:33. The only detail the prosecutor offered in support of this claim was the fact 
that he put his head down. R224:33. But putting one's head down is just as consistent 
with trying to concentrate and listen closely to the words. Additionally, some of the 
words were inaudible to even the court reporter, and putting one's head down is often 
done when a person is having trouble hearing or trying to focus on what is being said. 
While additional details - such as looking around the room, repeatedly checking one's 
watch, pulling out a phone and checking emails - might help support a strike of this 
nature, the one detail offered by the prosecutor was not sufficiently clear, detailed, 
convincing, or legitimate to withstand the scrutiny given this type of demeanor-based 
strike. See Mack, 861 N.E.2d at 297 (distinguishing between demeanor-based strike 
backed up by specific details and general claims of inattentiveness that can be used as a 
pretext). 
Further, the prosecutor indicated Juror 3 put his head down and "kept looking at 
[her] funny" while the judge was reading an excerpt suggesting that lawyers exercise 
their peremptory challenges based on improper factors such as how a person looks or his 
race or religion. R224:28. The article indicated that prosecutors prefer "the little old 
Lutheran lady in pearls" while defense lawyers prefer "an Irishman or a Jew." R224:28. 
Referring to jury selection, the article stated in part: 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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How do we choose among strangers not necessarily wise but merely 
registered to vote? Once the blatantly prejudice[d] have been sent packing, 
both sides take up the peremptory challenge of turning down jurors for the 
way they look, dress, or comb their hair. The differing agendas of the 
prosecution and the defense complicate matters. 
Prosecution lawyer, Jeffrey Tubin says that when he first came to the bar he 
was told to avoid men with beards, too independent and teachers and social 
workers, too sympathetic, and aim for the little old Lutheran lady in pearls, 
quick to judge and slow to forgive. 
For the defense, Clarence Darrow advised not to take a German, they are 
bull-headed; rarely take a Swede, they are stubborn. Always take an 
Irishman or a Jew, they are easiest to move to emotional sympathy. He 
preferred old men for their tolerance, but Samuel Lee Woods liked them 
young for their still fresh sense of brotherhood and avoided self-made men 
businessmen with close set eyes, writers, professors and former policemen. 
R224:28. The judge stopped reading at this point without ever clarifying that such 
stereotyping based on race, religion, or how a person looks is considered unfair and in 
violation of Equal Protection in today's world. The lawyers were only "half done" with 
their peremptory challenges at this point, and the next challenge entered by the 
prosecutor, strike three of four, struck Juror 3. R224:28; 158. 
Juror 3, the only minority on the panel and perhaps the only minority in the 
courtroom, was likely offended by this passage and wondering how he would be 
stereotyped. This is especially so since the lawyers knew very little about him and sought 
very little information from him or the other jurors. R224:l-28. While lawyers and 
judges may find a passage like this interesting and understand that basing jury selection 
on race, religion, or gender is now improper and unconstitutional, the jurors did not know 
that and reading a passage suggesting that such discrimination is acceptable was 
inappropriate. Looking down and looking at the prosecutor "funny" while this was being 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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read is an appropriate and thoughtful reaction to such a piece and further demonstrates 
the race based underpinnings to this strike. The excerpt injected race and other improper 
factors into the proceeding, and to the extent Juror 3 was reacting to what the judge was 
reading, those reactions are inextricably tied to race. Given the theme of the excerpt, the 
prosecutor's did not offer "a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried." 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 98.3 
In assessing whether an explanation is race neutral, courts also consider the voir 
dire of stricken jurors as well as other members of the panel and any other relevant 
factors found in the record. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 519 (reviewing record of voir dire, 
among other things, in assessing whether strike was race-neutral); Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 
869 (reviewing voir dire of stricken juror in assessing whether strike was race neutral); 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, [^18 n.3 (noting that record supported prosecutor's explanation). 
Here, the voir dire further demonstrates that the State's demeanor-based 
explanation was not race neutral. Juror 3 spoke only once and there were no follow-up 
questions. His statement indicated that he was 27 years old and a student at the 
University. R224:4. He was single and had no children and was born and raised in Salt 
3
 The prosecutor's strike, exercised while the judge was reading a 
potentially offensive passage, impacted on the rights of Juror 3 and the community 
as well as Harris's Equal Protection rights. See S.B.:14; State v. Valdez, 2006 UT 
39,1J17, 140 P.3d 1219 (recognizing that Batson protects litigants, jurors, and the 
community - that all are guaranteed Equal Protection injury selection). Aside 
from Harris's and society's interests, Juror 3's rights were violated here. He was 
informed that lawyers struck jurors based on how they looked or their race, then 
was stricken. This left the impression that he was stricken on racial grounds, 
especially where the lawyers knew very little about him. 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Lake City. R224:4. Nothing about this would suggest that he would be an inattentive 
juror - in fact, his answers suggest the opposite because he was intelligent, educated, in 
the prime of life, and did not have the distractions that some of the others had. 
The voir dire, like that in Cantu II, was "desultory;" few questions were asked, 
and the prosecutor did not pursue a course of questioning that would aid her in assessing 
which jurors might be attentive. See Cantu II, 778 P.2d at 519. She kept jurors whose 
answers suggested that they might have more difficulty paying attention than a 27-year-
old college student. For example, Juror 22 was 81 years old and retired, with a large 
extended family. R224:8. The prosecutor did not ask any questions delving into whether 
he would have difficulty paying attention based on age or distractions. Nor did she ask 
any questions indicating that inattentiveness was a concern in assessing Juror 3 or any of 
the other jurors. The prosecutor's approach to voir dire, her stated reason for the strike, 
the tone of the excerpt, and factors outlined above and contained in the record 
demonstrate that the strike was not race neutral and fail to rebut the prima facie showing 
of discrimination. See A.B.-.13-25. The peremptory challenge of Juror 3 violated Equal 
Protection and requires a new trial. 
C. Step 3 also requires reversal. 
Where a prosecutor offers a race neutral reason for the strike, step 3 requires 
reversal when the opponent to the strike establishes purposeful discrimination. See 
Colwell, 2000 UT 8, [^17. Courts consider "the plausibility of the reason in light of all 
evidence with a bearing on it." Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 151-52 (2005) (citation 
omitted). Even when a trial court has made a credibility determination in favor of the 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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prosecutor and upheld the strike, step 3 requires reversal where "the stated reason does 
not hold up" in light of the record. Id.; Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 485 (2008). 
"[A]ll of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity" are 
considered in assessing whether the plausibility of the explanation for the strike. Id. at 
478. A trial court's observations are important to this determination, but when a court 
"simply allow[s] the challenge without explanation," it cannot be "presume[d] that the 
trial judge credited the prosecutor's assertion." Id. at 479. Instead, "[i]t is possible that the 
judge did not have any impression one way or the other . . . ." Id.; see A.B.:28-29. 
Like the cases cited in A.B.:30-31, the circumstances of this case show 
discriminatory intent. First, the "trial court did not sufficiently question and evaluate the 
prosecutor's exercise of his peremptory challenges," People v. Gonzales, 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
205, 214 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008), and it cannot be presumed that the court gave them any 
credit. See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 479. Second, the record establishes that even if the 
explanation is considered race neutral, it is not plausible. This is so because the record 
shows that Juror 3 was intelligent and educated and did not have the distractions of work 
or a family. The prosecutor did not pursue any line of questioning with him suggesting 
that she was concerned about his attentiveness, nor did she suggest that he was not paying 
attention or looking at her funny during voir dire. And she did not question other jurors 
about attentiveness, particularly Juror 22 who was 81-years-old. 
Additionally, the reasons why the explanation was not racially neutral also 
demonstrate discriminatory intent if the third step is reached. See supra at p. 6-8. The 
prosecutor's claim that Juror 3 was inattentive and looking at her funny while the trial 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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judge was reading a potentially offensive article was not a plausible, case related, or 
legitimate reason for dismissing the juror. See supra at 6-8. It is not clear from the record 
that the juror was not paying attention or that he gave the prosecutor funny looks, but 
even if that were the case, the nature of the article being read could easily have been the 
source of that behavior, not inattentiveness or dislike for the prosecutor. Moreover, the 
"desultory voir dire," nature of the case, failure to pursue questioning regarding 
attentiveness, voir dire answers, and stated reasons for the challenge work together to 
show discriminatory intent. 
For all of the reasons set forth herein and in A.B., the record demonstrates that the 
prosecutor's explanation was racially discriminatory and the trial court erred in allowing 
it. A new trial is required based the Equal Protection violation that occurred in this case. 
POINT II. THIS COURT CAN REVIEW THIS ISSUE. 
Harris's Batson objection was preserved where his lawyer objected at a sidebar 
and the judge required the prosecutor to explain her strike before the jury was sworn. 
Although this objection was preserved, it can also be reviewed for plain error or 
ineffective assistance of counsel. The State's claim that this Court should disregard the 
Equal Protection violation that occurred here because Harris's attorney did not obtain an 
explicit ruling on the Batson challenge and passed the jury for cause is not supported by 
the facts, case law, Equal Protection, or fairness. 
A. The Batson challenge is preserved. 
Defense counsel raised the Batson challenge in a sidebar before the jury was 
sworn and venire dismissed. The judge and prosecutor understood that counsel was 
11 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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making a Batson challenge as evidenced by the later discussion where the judge 
specifically referred to Batson, stating, "[defense counsel] did ask to approach the bench 
on a Bastan [sic] challenge. I'll let you make your record now, [defense counsel]." 
R224:32. Although it was at time inaudible, the recording of the sidebar also shows that 
the prosecutor and judge understood that defense counsel was making a Batson challenge 
at that time, that the judge was requiring the prosecutor to explain her strike, and that she 
offered an explanation. R224:29-30. That explanation was inaudible during the sidebar, 
but the court told the prosecutor, "[w]hy don't we put that on the record after the break." 
R224:29-30. And when the record was ultimately made, the judge let the parties "make 
your record now," then just listened and did not rule, thereby indicating that he had 
already rejected the challenge. R224:34. Contrary to the State's argument, the record 
shows that defense counsel "approach[ed] the bench on a [Batson] challenge" and that 
the challenge was heard and ruled on before the venire was dismissed. R224:29-30, 32. 
Despite the fact that the trial court heard and ruled on the objection before the jury 
was sworn, the State claims that Harris waived the Batson claim because "he passed the 
jury for cause," S.B.:16, "did not allege that the prosecutor intentionally discriminated 
when she struck [Juror 3]" S.B.:17, and did not obtain a ruling. S.B. at 15-18. None of 
these arguments for waiver withstand scrutiny, and to accept the State's waiver argument 
would erect a hyper-technical and often insurmountable preservation rule that would 
serve no purpose. 
An issue is preserved when it is presented in a way that gives the trial court the 
opportunity to rule on it. Patterson v. Patterson, 2011 UT 68, \\2, —P.3d — (citations 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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omitted). It is a self-imposed rule and "therefore one of prudence rather than 
jurisdiction." Id. at f 13. Requiring that an issue be preserved in the trial court serves "two 
primary considerations . . . judicial economy and fairness." Id, at TJ15. First, the 
preservation rule serves judicial economy because it gives the trial court an opportunity 
to correct error and avoid retrials and appeals. Id. Second, fairness is served because the 
trial court has an opportunity to rule, both parties have an opportunity to address the issue 
without waiting for an appeal, and a party is precluded from lying in the weeds and 
"avoiding the issue at trial for strategic reasons only to raise the issue on appeal if the 
strategy fails.'" Id. at [^16 (citation omitted). Both considerations were served in this case 
since the trial court had the opportunity to rule before the jury was sworn and could have 
corrected the error then, both parties had the opportunity to address the issue, and defense 
counsel did not avoid the issue and instead actively sought resolution at the sidebar. 
"[T]he Batson test is meant to 'encourage[ ] prompt rulings on objections to 
peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process." State 
v. Valdez, 2006 UT 39, ^19, 140 P.3d 1219 (citation omitted). While the high court has 
left states to fashion timeliness rules for Batson challenges, it has nevertheless recognized 
that requiring Batson claims to be raised '"in the period between selection of jurors and 
administration of their oaths, is a sensible rule.5" Id. at Tfl9 (quoting Ford v. Georgia, 498 
U.S. 411, 422-23 (1991)). And, a state's timeliness rule for Batson challenges must be 
"'firmly established and regularly followed'" in order to preclude review of a federal 
Equal Protection claim under Batson. Id. (quoting Ford, 498 U.S. at 423-24). 
This Court articulated a timeliness rule in Valdez, requiring that a Batson 
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challenge be raised before the jury is sworn and the venire dismissed in order to be 
timely. Id. at ffl[38, 46. The rationale for requiring the challenge at this time is that 
promptness will allow the opponent to "be better able to make out a prima facie case," 
allow the proponent of the strike to be more capable of rebutting the challenge while 
information is fresh, and allow the trial judge to more readily assess the claim and fashion 
a remedy. Id. at ]fl}43-44. This requirement that the challenge be raised before the jury is 
sworn and venire is dismissed furthers both considerations behind the preservation rule -
judicial economy by allowing the trial judge to decide the claim and fashion a remedy 
and fairness since it precludes "sandbagging," allows the parties to address the issue 
while information is fresh, and gives the trial court the opportunity to fix the problem. Id. 
at 1f44. 
Following Valdez, this Court further discussed the preservation rule in State v. 
Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, 190 P.3d 1259. In Rosa-Re, during a side bar held before the jury 
was sworn or the venire dismissed, the defendant "referenced Batson in the context of 
jury selection and noted that male jurors had been stricken." Id. at [^8. Although the State 
argued, like it does in this case, that Rosa-Re did not make a "clear and concise allegation 
of an equal protection violation because he did not allege that the prosecutor had 
intentionally discriminated," this Court rejected that rigid approach to raising Batson 
challenges. Id. at ffi[9-12. Instead, this Court found it "simply inconceivable that the trial 
court was unaware that defense counsel was raising a Batson challenge," id. at TJ10, and 
reiterated that "referencing Batson in the context of jury selection prior to the swearing of 
the jury and the dismissal of the venire was sufficient to satisfy the timeliness rule and 
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put the trial court on notice of the objection . . . . " Id. at ^ [12. 
While the Batson challenge in Rosa-Re was considered sufficient and timely under 
existing rules, this Court took the opportunity in dictum to suggest a future timeliness 
rule for Batson challenges. Id. at f^ 13. That future timeliness rule mandates that trial 
courts "have an obligation to resolve Batson objections before the jury is sworn and the 
venire dismissed," and where trial court fails to follow this mandate, requires trial 
counsel to request resolution. Id. 
We clarify that in the future, however, trial courts have an obligation to resolve 
Batson objections before the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed. Given that 
the express purpose of Batson is to correct a constitutionally deficient jury 
composition before the jury is actually seated and sworn, postponing the resolution 
is inappropriate. 
Moreover, in the event that the trial court fails to timely resolve a Batson 
objection, defense counsel has an absolute obligation to notify the court that 
resolution is needed before the jury is sworn and the venire is dismissed. Failure to 
do so, or acquiescing in the court's inaction [fn], will in the future constitute a 
waiver of the original objection. 
[fn] In this case, the trial court asked, "Is this the jury you selected?" Defense 
counsel replied, "Yes, Your Honor." In the future, such acquiescence in the jury 
selection will be deemed a waiver of & Batson objection." 
Id. at ^13-14. The State's reliance on this latter passage and footnote to support its claim 
that Harris waived his Batson claim is not supported by the record or the considerations 
behind the preservation rule. Moreover, precluding review under these circumstances 
would thwart the Equal Protection guarantees and allow the discriminatory use of 
peremptory challenges without serving any of the preservations rule's purposes. 
As a starting point, this case is different from Rosa-Re because defense counsel 
not only articulated a clear Batson challenge, as was done in Rosa-Re, but the court found 
15 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a prima facie case and required the State to supply its explanation while memories were 
fresh. R224:29-30. Although the explanation is not evident in the record of the sidebar, it 
is evident that when asked "do you have a reason for that?" the prosecutor responded 
with something more than "yeah." R224:29. The prosecutor's inaudible portion after 
"yeah" in context was the purported reason for the strike. The court's immediate 
followup, "[w]hy don't we put that on the record during the break?" refers to the reason. 
And, when the prosecutor later stated her reason on the record, there was no further 
discussion or a ruling, signaling that the discussion and ruling had already occurred 
during the sidebar. In fact, the record relating to the sidebar shows that Harris did not 
waive this issue. 
The court: And for the record, [defense counsel], you did pass the jury 
for cause? 
Defense counsel: I think we need to approach for a minute. 
The court: Okay, would you approach the bench? 
Defense counsel Oh, we do pass for cause, yes. 








The concern [inaudible] is Juror No. 3 is struck by the 
State [inaudible] ability [inaudible] she needs to justify 
[inaudible]. 
All right, do you have a reason for that? 
Yeah, [inaudible]. 
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The court: Why don't we put that on the record during the break? 
Defense counsel: Okay, I just wanted to inform you (inaudible). 
R224:29-30. Like Rosa-Re, it is inconceivable that the trial court did not understand that 
counsel was making a Batson challenge, and the record later leaves no question of this 
since the court referred to counsel's earlier Batson challenge. R224:29-30, 32-33. 
Additionally, the trial court had the opportunity to remedy the problem but chose not to 
reinstate Juror 3, thereby denying the Batson challenge. 
Counsel's statement that he passed the jury for cause also did not waive the Batson 
challenge. Defense counsel initially asked to approach when the judge asked whether he 
had passed the jury for cause. As he approached, he realized that the question referred to 
whether he had any for cause challenges, not whether he accepted the jury as selected. 
Passing the jury for cause usually occurs before peremptories are exercised, as is apparent 
from the judge's use of the past tense, and an affirmative response refers to and waives 
only challenges for cause. See Utah R. Crim. P. 18. Passing the jurors for cause is 
different from the statement in Rosa-Re where this Court cautioned that if counsel agrees 
that the jury is the one he selected, a Batson challenge would be waived. Rosa-Re, 2008 
UT 53, Tfl4 n.5. Further, in the context of what occurred, it is evident that while counsel 
passed the jury for cause in that he did not plan to challenge any of the jurors for cause, 
he nevertheless believed that there was a problem with the jury as selected due to the 
prosecutor's strike of Juror 3. 
Moreover, while the record indicates that counsel preserved the Batson claim 
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before the jury was empaneled, even if there were a technical mistake in not obtaining an 
explicit ruling, precluding review based on that mistake does not fit within accepted 
notions of preservation. Although Rosa-Re's dictum cautions lawyers to obtain a ruling, 
Batson mandates that trial courts "have the duty to determine if the defendant has 
established purposeful discrimination." Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. The judge here had an 
opportunity to rule and counsel was seeking a ruling before the jury was empaneled, and 
there is no concern that defense counsel was sandbagging since he brought the matter to 
the judge's attention and challenged the prosecutor's explanation. R224:29-30, 34. In the 
end, though arguably not perfect, defense counsel brought this claim to the trial court's 
attention, received an implicit ruling, and otherwise preserved this issue for review. 
Adopting the State's rigid view of waiver or dictum in Rosa-Re to prevent review in these 
circumstances would not serve either the purposes behind the preservation rule or the 
important interests of jurors, the community, and the defendant that are protected by 
Batson. Indeed, the Equal Protection interests of the community and jurors would not be 
served at all by adopting such a rigid preservation rule, and defendants likewise would 
lose their right to Equal Protection injury selection unless their lawyers were able to 
jump through all the unnecessary hoops the State erects. 
B. The issue can also be reviewed under the plain error doctrine. 
The State's argument that Harris's Batson claim cannot be reviewed for plain error 
based on invited error fails because (1) these circumstances do not demonstrate that 
defense counsel invited the error, and (2) the doctrine of invited error should not apply to 
Batson claims since the importance of the Equal Protection guarantee would be 
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undermined and the purpose of protecting the community and jurors from discrimination 
injury selection would not be met. Additionally, courts routinely address Batson claims 
under plain error, and to the extent the trial court failed to rule, that error was obvious and 
prejudiced Harris since he had a meritorious Batson claim, requiring reversal. 
/. Harris did not invite the error. 
The doctrine of invited error does not preclude plain error review in this case 
because defense counsel did not "engage[ ] in a conscious and affirmative act that led the 
trial court to commit the [ ] error. " State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, TJ8, 86 P.3d 742. 
"[T]he invited error doctrine is crafted to '"discourage [ ] parties from intentionally 
misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal,5" [and] 
it is also intended to give the trial court the first opportunity to address the claim of 
error." Id. at [^12 (citations omitted). 
The invited error doctrine applies only in circumstances where the defendant 
"affirmatively endorsed" a trial court action by specifically indicating that the trial court's 
approach was proper. See id. at^U;Statev. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,^13, 128 P.3d 1171. A 
defendant invites an error only where he leads the court into committing an error by 
affirmatively indicating that the court's decision is proper and not in these circumstances 
where Harris objected to the procedure. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, [^14 (citation omitted). 
Utah appellate courts have used the doctrine of invited error to avoid review in 
circumstances where the defendant has affirmatively indicated that a specific procedure is 
proper. For example, in the context of jury instructions, a defendant invites an error 
where defense counsel states she has no objection to the instruction, State v. Medina, 738 
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P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987), where counsel does not object when specifically asked or 
proposed the same instruction, Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, fflflO, 12 (citation omitted), or 
where counsel objected to the correct instruction, State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, 
f55, 989 P.2d 1091. In each of these cases, defense counsel acted affirmatively in 
endorsing the instruction at issue, thereby giving rise to the invited error doctrine when 
the defendant later complained of the instruction on appeal. 
By contrast, the invited error doctrine does not apply "where counsel for the party 
complaining on appeal merely remained silent at trial." Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023 (citing 
State v. Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 81 (Utah 1983); State v. Smith, 62 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1936)). 
Invited error is based on "the principle that a party cannot take advantage of an error 
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." Winfield, 
2006 UT 4, Tfl5 (quotations and citations omitted). "By precluding appellate review, the 
doctrine furthers this principle by ' discouraging] parties from intentionally misleading 
the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id. (citations 
omitted). The doctrine applies to "[affirmative representations that a party has no 
objection to the proceedings" because such affirmative representations regarding a 
specific action by the court "reassure the trial court and encourage it to proceed without 
further consideration of the issues." Id. at 1J16. 
This case is different from Winfield where the defendant invited the error by 
affirmatively representing that he had no objection to the jury panel. Id. at ][13. When the 
defendant in Winfield later argued on appeal that the judge had failed to adequately probe 
the jurors who were empaneled, this Court concluded that his affirmative representation 
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below that he had no objection to the jurors invited the error and precluded review. Id. at 
Tfl6. This case is also different from Rosa-Re where defense counsel answered 
affirmatively when asked, "Is this the jury you selected?" Rosa-Re, 2008 UT 53, Tfl4 n. 5; 
see supra p. 17. In both Winfield and Rosa-Re, defendant affirmatively stated that he had 
no objection to the jury that was empaneled. By contrast, in this case, defense counsel 
indicated only that he did not challenge the jurors for cause while at the same time 
making it clear that he had an Equal Protection challenge to the jury that was selected. 
Because counsel did not say that he had no objection to the jury that was selected, he 
neither waived nor invited this error. 
Defense counsel timely brought the Batson issue to the trial court's attention, 
obtained an implicit denial of his claim, and even after the judge told him that he could 
make his record later, spoke up. R224:30. Moreover, the judge's behavior at the later 
discussion that appeared on the record indicates that the judge had already denied the 
Batson challenge since the judge simply listened as counsel made their record, and 
nothing about defense counsel's statements can be construed as an affirmative act that led 
the court into this error. In fact, the record shows that counsel was attempting to obtain a 
timely ruling on his Batson challenge and reasonably believed that he had done so. 
Hence, the error was not invited. 
Additionally, using invited error to preclude review of valid Batson claims would 
undermine the Batson protection and disregard the fact that discriminatory peremptory 
challenges violate the Equal Protection rights of not only the defendant but also of the 
affected juror and the community as a whole. See People v. Tapia, 30 Cal. Rptr 2d 851, 
21 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
877 (Cal. App. 5 Dist 1994) (refusing to apply invited error doctrine to Batson claims). 
Using the doctrine of invited error to preclude review of Batson claims 
would leave unremedied the harm caused to the excluded jurors and the 
community. . . . [T]he invited-error doctrine would nullify the high court's 
very rationale for elevating the racially neutral jury right to its lofty position 
in the hierarchy of federal constitutional rights. Because we live in a multi-
racial society, deliberate racial discrimination by the government will not 
be condoned. 
Id. Hence, the doctrine of invited error should not be used to save a prosecutor's 
discriminatory challenge from review.4 
The trial court had "the duty to apply the correct law." Id. at 878; see also Batson, 
476 U.S. at 98 (trial judge had duty to rule after prosecutor stated race neutral 
explanation). Because the right to Equal Protection injury selection protects not only 
defendants, but also jurors and the community as a whole, courts are required to "ensure 
that the jury selection procedures are fair and nondiscriminatory[.]" Valdez, 2006 UT 39, 
[^17. In this case, where counsel did not affirmatively cause the error and where 
application of the invited error doctrine would annihilate the more important Equal 
protection guarantee, the State is incorrect that invited error precludes plain error review. 
ii. Using plain error review to reach Batson claims serves the important Equal 
Protection interests that gave rise to these claims. 
Courts use plain error to reach Batson claims even when defense counsel said 
nothing in the trial court regarding the government's use of a peremptory. For example, 
4
 The State's argument that this Court should refuse to review Batson claims for plain 
error or ineffective assistance when a defendant waives the issue confuses waiver with 
invited error, is without support, and would eviscerate both doctrines as well as the 
importance of the Equal protection guarantee outlined in Batson and its progeny. 
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the court of appeals recognized in State v. Harrison, that the gravity of an Equal 
Protection claim in this context allowed a Batson claim to be reviewed for plain error 
even when the objection was not raised below. 805 P.2d 769, 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); 
see also Cruse v. State, 67 P.3d 920, 921 (Okla. Ct Crim. App. 2003); McMillan v. State, 
_So.3d—, 2010 WL 4380259, * 12-13 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010). Even though Batson 
claims can be more complicated on appeal where the government has not been asked to 
state the reason for the strike, courts nevertheless review such claims even when they are 
raised in their entirety for the first time on appeal. See Harrison, 805 P.2d at 779; United 
States v. Gooch, —F.3d—, 2012 WL 29191, *5 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 6, 2012); see also Lackey 
v. State, —So.3d—, 2010 WL 4380219, *l-2 (Ala. Crim. App. Nov. 5, 2010) (plain error 
review requires remand for government to explain strikes). 
In this case, where defense counsel objected to the strike, the trial court ordered 
the prosecutor to give a reason for the strike, and the judge subsequently proceeded 
without granting the strike, to the extent the issue was not preserved, it can readily be 
reviewed for plain error. As outlined in A.B.:38-41 and supra p. 1-11, the trial court 
committed obvious error to the extent it failed to grant the Batson challenge either by 
determining that the explanation was not race neutral or proceeding to the next step and 
not finding discriminatory intent. 
Moreover, the error was prejudicial since the record shows that the State used its 
peremptory in a discriminatory fashion. As set forth in A.B. and supra p. 1-11, the 
State's strike violated Equal Protection where there was a prima facie showing of 
discrimination, followed by a strike that was not race neutral. Additionally, even if the 
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strike was race neutral, the circumstances showed discriminatory intent. Equal Protection 
was violated in this case, requiring reversal since Batson errors are structural and do not 
require a showing of harm. 
Hi. The error can also be reviewed for ineffective assistance. 
As set forth in A.B.:42-45, to the extent Rosa-Re mandates that defense counsel 
insist on a ruling or counsel otherwise failed to preserve this issue, counsel performed 
deficiently. Additionally, because Batson error occurred either because the explanation 
was not race neutral or, even if it was, because the record establishes discriminatory 
intent, the error was prejudicial since the prosecutor's strike violated Equal Protection. 
Since Batson error is structural, any error attributed to counsel in failing to prevail on and 
preserve the meritorious Batson challenge is prejudicial and requires a new trial. 
Courts routinely employ ineffective assistance analyses in circumstances where 
defense counsel failed to raise a Batson claim below. See e.g. Randolph v. Delo, 952 F.2d 
243, 246 (8th Cir. 1991); Stokes v. State, 715 S.E.2d 81, 83-84 (Ga. 2011); State v. 
Robertson, 630 N.E.2d 422, 429 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (court reviews untimely Batson 
claim for ineffective assistance, recognizing that no legitimate tactical reason existed for 
delaying until after jury was sworn). 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel applies to Batson 
claims, and the State's attempt to remove these claims from Sixth Amendment protection 
undermines the important function of the Batson protection. In a case like this, where 
counsel made an objection and the State was asked to provide an explanation, if counsel 
was required to insist on a ruling, his failure to do so violated Harris's right to Equal 
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Protection, as well as the Equal Protection rights of Juror 3 and the community. The 
stringent waiver rule advocated by the State would allow prosecutors to discriminate in 
the use of peremptory challenges unless defense counsel were able to jump through all 
the technical hoops and would deprive criminal defendants of the right to effective 
assistance at a critical stage. Not allowing ineffective assistance claims for Batson 
violations would frustrate the purpose of Batson and leave jurors who are discriminated 
against and the community at large without a remedy in circumstances where defense 
counsel fails to adequately preserve the claim of discriminatory behavior for review. In 
this case, to the extent counsel did not preserve the claim, he provided ineffective 
assistance since the prosecutor violated Equal Protection in striking Juror 3. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant/Defendant Antoine Harris respectfully requests that this Court overturn 
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this & day of February, 2012. 
Z'UXCty 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Q* 
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WEST JORDAN, UTAH; OCTOBER 28, 2 009 
JUDGE TERRY CHRISTIANSEN 
(Transcriber's note: speaker identification 
may not be accurate with audio recordings,) 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. Welcome to Third 
District Court. My name is Terry Christiansen, I'll be the 
judge presiding in this case. I'm.sorry to get such a slow 
start. Normally we have 90 plus percent of jurors that 
appear but today we had nine out of 30 that didn't show up so 
we've been waiting hoping we'd have enough jurors to proceed 
and hopefully we will. 
This is the matter of State of Utah vs. Antoine 
Darnell Harris. It is a criminal case. The case number is 
081400099. 
Is the State ready to proceed, Ms. Serassio? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is the defense ready to proceed, Mr. 
McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I am. 
THE COURT: What I'm going to do is have each of 
you stand, raise your right hand, I'll have my clerk swear 
you in as prospective jurors. 
(Prospective jurors sworn) 
THE COURT: Be seated. I'm going to ask just a few 
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general questions to make sure you all qualify as jurors. 
Are each of you citizens of the United States and over the 
age of 18? If you are not, please raise your hand.. The 
record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Do each of you read, speak, and understand the 
English language? If you do not again, please raise your 
hand. The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Are each of you residents of Salt Lake County at 
the present time? If you are not, please raise you hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Do each of you consider yourself to be of sound 
mind, body and discretion? If you have any concerns in those 
areas, again, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Have any of you been convicted of a felony or 
malfeasance in office? If so, please raise your hand. The 
record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
And finally, are any of you in the active military 
service at the present time? If so, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Both counsel stipulate as to the general 
qualifications and competence of the panel? Ms. Serassio? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes, sir. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: We do, Your Honor. 
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1 I THE COURT: All right. We're going to start with 
2 Mr. Johnson. I'm going to have you stand. I think you 
3 should - yeah, just go through that list and tell us a little 
4 bit about yourself. 
5 MR. JOHNSON: Okay, my name is Ralph Johnson. My 
6 age is 54 and I've gone through high school, graduated high 
7 school. My occupation is (inaudible) technician. I am 
8 married. My spouse's name is Brenda and her occupation is a 
9 house - homemaker. I live in Sandy and I've lived in Salt 
10 Lake County all my life and number of children, I have two. 
11 My son is 26 and my daughter is 35. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
13 Next is Ms. Ritter. 
14 MS. RITTER: My name is Jane Ritter. My age is 80. 
15 I have been educated in Ohio, high school, attended Ohio 
16 State University. I'm a retired travel agent. I am a widow. 
17 Spouse name and occupation doesn't seen particularly 
18 relevant. However, my spouse was a member of the military. 
19 I am a resident of the area. I've lived in Salt Lake County 
20 probably 30 years. I have five children, one is dead. Their 
21 ages start at 58 and decrease from there to 50. Is that 
22 close enough? 
23 THE COURT: That's close enough. Thank you. 
24 MS. RITTER: And also, would you turn up the 
25 microphone. I don't hear real well. 
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THE COURT: I don't know that we can turn it up but 
we'll do the best we can. 
MS. RITTER: Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Chow. 
MR. CHOW: My name is (inaudible) Chow. I'm 27. I 
graduated high school. I'm still going to school up at the U. 
Occupation is still student. I'm single. I live in the Salt 
Lake area. I was actually born and raised in Salt Lake so 
I've lived here all my life and I have no kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Ms. Bunting. 
MS. BUNTING: My name is Lamoy Bunting. I'm 78 
years old. I graduated from high school and one year of 
college I am a homemaker. I am married. My husband 
retired. Robert is my husband's name and he worked for US 
West. I live in Midvale and have lived in the county a good 
portion of my life. I have four daughters, oldest one 55 on 
down to the youngest at 42. 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. 
Next is Ms. Price. 
MS. PRICE: My name is Heather Price. I'm 28 years 
old. I have some college. I work for an insurance company. 
I am married to Thomas Price. He works up as the University 
of Utah in the kitchen. I live in Murray and have lived 
there my entire life. I have one son and he's 12. 
4 
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THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Merkley. 
MR. MERKLEY: .My name is Robert Merkley. I'm 50 
years old. I have some college education. I'm a business 
owner of an engineering, structural engineering company. I 
am married. My spouse's name is Jennifer Merkley. She is a 
homemaker. I live in Holladay. I have resided in Salt Lake 
County for 29 years. We have four children ranging from 28 
years of age to 14. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Fulmer. 
MR. FULLMER: My name is Jason Fullmer. I'm 33. I 
have a bachelor's degree. My occupation is software 
engineer. I'm married to Andrea and she stays at home. I 
live in West Jordan and I've been in Salt Lake County my 
whole life and I have three children, ages nine, seven and 
five. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Let's go to the top row. We'll start with Mr. 
Ludlow. 
MR. LUDLOW: My name is Jason Ludlow. I'm 4 0 years 
old. I work in construction. I have a little bit of college 
education. I'm single. I've lived in Salt Lake County my 
whole life and I have no kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Next is Mr. Maylen. 
MR. MAYLEN: My name is Kent Maylen. I'm age 56. 
I've attended UTC and the University of Utah. I'm a custom 
frame builder. I'm single. I've lived in Salt Lake County 
most of my life and I have a daughter aged 35. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Ms. Van Rosendahl. 
MS. VAN ROSENDAHL: My name is Kathryn Van 
Rosendahl. I'm 25. I have my associates, I'm working on my 
bachelor's. I'm a legal assistant and a waitress, single. I 
live in Sugarhouse and I've lived there all 25 years and I 
have no kids. 
THE COURT: Ma'am, where do you work as a legal 
assistant? 
MS. VANROSENDAHL: Vancott, Bagley, Cornwall, 
McCarthy. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Norman. 
MR. NORMAN: I'm - go by Bret Norman. I'm 54. I 
had a year of technical college but I'm a Wonder Bread 
salesman and have been for about 30 years; married to a 
wonderful girl named Tina and she's a secretary. I live in 
Glendale and I've been in Utah for about 40 years. I have 
one son whose 36. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
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1 Next is Mr. Carpenter. 
2 MR. CARPENTER: My name is David Carpenter. I am 
3 70. I have a graduate degree. I am retired customer service 
4 agent from Delta Airlines. I am single. I have been living 
5 in Salt Lake County for 23 years. I have no children. 
6 THE COURT: Thank you. 
7 Next is Mr. Perry. 
8 ' M R . PERRY: My name is Jeff Perry. I am 33 years 
9 old. I have roughly three years of college. I am in sales 
10 for a snowboarding shop. I am married to a girl named 
11 Breanna. Her occupation is flight attendant for Sky West 
12 Airlines. I live kind of in that Millcreek/Murray/South Salt 
13 Lake area. I've been in Utah for about 13 years in Salt Lake 
14 off and on for that time, no children. 
15 THE COURT: Thank you. Next is Mr. Smith. 
16 MR. SMITH: My name is Sean Smith - sorry my voice 
17 is giving out. 
18 THE COURT: You're fine. 
19 MR. SMITH: I'm 22. I graduated high school and 
20 attended college. I'm an employee, I'm single. I live in 
21 Sugarhouse. I've lived here for three years. I have no 
22 children. 
23 THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
24 All right. Let's so to the back of the courtroom 
25 and we'll start with Mr. Berg. 
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MR. BERG: My name is Steven Berg, I'm 47. I have 
a bachelor's in (inaudible) technology. I am married. My 
wife's name is Stacey and she's a medical assistant. I 
reside in Riverton area, lived in Salt Lake County 20 years. 
I have two children, a 23 year old daughter and 19 year old 
son. 
THE COURT: Thank you. Next is Mr. Campbell. 
MR. CAMPBELL: My name is David Campbell. My age 
is 81, four years of college. I have a manufacturing firm 
from which I'm retired. My son is now running that. I'm 
married. My wife's name is Mary Elizabeth. I've been in the 
area for 40 some odd years. I have seven children, 24 
grandchildren, and 14 great grandchildren. 
THE COURT: Good for you. Thank you. 
Next is Mr. Stevenson. 
MR. STEVENSON: I'm Justin Stevenson. I. am 2 9 
years old. I graduated from the University of Utah. I 
manage bank owned properties right now. I am single and I've 
lived in Sugarhouse for about three years now and I have no 
kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Next Mr. Brown. 
MR. BROWN: My name is Richard Brown. I'm 55 years 
old. I have a 4-year degree. I'm a registered nurse. I'm 
divorced. I'm a registered nurse. I've been in the area for 
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18 years. I have one child, 24 years old. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
Next is Mr. Cressor. 
MR. CRESSOR: My name is Chad Cressor. I'm 31. I 
have a high school diploma. I work for a manufacturing 
company. I'm married to Misha Cressor. She works for a 
title company. I'm a resident of Sandy for nine years. I 
have two children 11 and 4. 
THE COURT: Thank you. • 
Mr. Day? 
MR. DAY: My name is James Day. I am 60 years of 
age. I hold a bachelor's and master's degree from the 
University of Utah. I'm a registered architect in the State 
of Utah. I'm married to Kathryn Day. She is a homemaker. 
We live in Sandy and we've lived in Salt Lake County for the 
last 18 years. Prior to that we were in Pasadena, 
California. I have four children and one grandchild. 
THE COURT: Thank you, sir. 
And finally, Mr. Nielsen? 
MR. NIELSEN: Yeah, my name is Pete Nielsen. I'm 
4 9 years old. I graduated from the University of Utah with 
BS degree. Currently I own a residential housecleaning 
business. I'm not married. Currently I live in Riverton. . 
Lived in Salt Lake County most of my life. No kids. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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All right. I've going to read the salient part of 
the information which is the charging document in this case. 
It read as follows: 
"State of Utah vs. Antoine Darnell Harris. The 
undersigned, Detective Ann Valencia, Taylorsville City Police 
Department upon written affidavit states on information and 
belief that the defendant committed the crimes of Count 1, 
Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony at 125 West 
Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake County, State of Utah on or 
about December 18, 2007 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, 
Section 103, Utah Code, in that the defendant, Antoine 
Darnell Harris, a party to the offense, did assault Sarah 
Michel as defined in Utah Code 76-5-102 and used other means 
or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury." 
Count 2 is Assault, Domestic Violence, a Class B 
Misdemeanor Felony, at 1275 West Clubhouse Drive in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah on or about December 18, 2007 in 
violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, Section 102 and Title 77, 
Chapter 37, Section 1 of the Utah Code, in that the 
defendant, Antoine Darnell Harris, a party to the offense did 
assault another with unlawful force or violence to do bodily 
injury, then threatened accompanied by a show of immediate 
show force or violence to do bodily injury or did commit an 
act with unlawful force or violence that caused bodily injury 
and furthermore, the defendant and the victim were co-
10 
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habitants."' 
To those two counts the defendant has entered pleas 
of. not guilty. 
This case should be completed today. I would 
anticipate that the evidence should be finished sometime mid-
afternoon and we would read the jury instructions, do closing 
arguments and hopefully you'd have it by mid to late 
afternoon for your deliberations. Are there any of you 
because of pressing family or business matters cannot devote 
your full time and attention to this case if you were 
selected to serve on the jury? If any of you could not 
devote your full time and attention, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. • 
I know that Mr. Ritter indicated that she hearing 
issues. Are there any others that have any physical ailments 
that would prevent you from serving on the jury? These could 
be things such as a recent surgery, back problems, eye 
problems, hearing problems. Anyone other that Ms. Ritter? 
If so, please raise your hand. The record will reflect that 
no hands are raised. 
Ms. Ritter have you been able to hear me okay? 
MS. RITTER: I can hear you pretty well. 
. THE COURT: If you were selected on the jury in 
this case and I had you sit in the seat closest to the 
witness box, do you think you'd be able to hear okay? 
11 
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MS. RITTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. And ma'am, if you are 
selected and you have a problem hearing, just raise your hand 
and don't be bashful, just say can you speak up and we'll 
have them speak up. Okay? Thank you ma'am. 
MS. RITTER: Thank you for your consideration. 
THE COURT: No problem. 
All right. If you are selected to be on the jury, 
you need to understand that the Court is to preside and see 
that the rules of law and the evidence are complied with and 
to instruct you on the law applicable to this case. Are 
there any of you who would not be willing to accept the law 
as given to you by the Court regardless of what you believe 
the law is or ought to be? If you could not accept the 
statements of law given to you by the Court, please raise 
your hand. The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
Do you any of you know anything about this case 
other than having simply listened to the information being 
read? If so, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Ms. Serassio, if you'd stand, identify yourself and 
any witnesses you anticipate calling today. 
MS. SERASSIO: Thank you, Your Honor. 
My name is Melanie Serassio. I am a Deputy 
District Attorney with the Salt Lake County District 
12 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 Attorney's Office. Witnesses that I have present today are 
2 Officer Valencia from Taylorsville Police Department, Officer 
3 I Cooper from Taylorsville Police Department, Sarah Michel is a 
4 witness in this case. I also have Dr. Lori Frasier coming to 
5 testify today. She works with the Primary Children's Medical 
6 Center. There are two other people involved in this case who 
7 will not be present to testify today but I want to identify 
8 them so that you know them, Michael Eckhart and Amber Wardle. 
9 THE COURT: Do any of you know Ms. Serassio or the 
10 witnesses she has identified? If so, please raise your hand? 
11 The record will reflect that no hands, are raised. 
12 Mr. McCaughey, if you'd stand and identify 
13 yourself, your client, and any witnesses you anticipate 
14 calling today. 
15 ' M R . MCCAUGHEY: Your Honor, I am Steve McCaughey 
16 and I practice law here in Salt Lake. Antoine Harris is my 
17 client and he will be the only witness we anticipate. 
18 THE COURT: All right. Do any of you know Mr. 
19 Mcaughey or Mr. Harris? If so, please raise your hand. 
20 Again the record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
21 Have any of you served on a jury before? If so, 
22 please raise your hand. All right, let's start on the first 
23 row with Mr. Johnson. 
24 Mr. Johnson, how long ago and what type of case? 
25 MR. JOHNSON: It was probably about 15 years ago 
13 
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1 and it was a drug related (inaudible). 
2 THE COURT: Do you remember what the verdict was in 
3 the case, guilty or not guilty? 
4 MR. JOHNSON: It was not guilty. 
5 MR. MCCAUGHEY: What kind of case was it? 
6 THE COURT: It was a drug case. 
7 Anyone else in the first row? All right, the back 
8 row, Mr. Ludlow. 
9 MR. LUDLOW: It was probably about 15 years ago. 
10 It was a child abuse case. 
11 THE COURT: And do you remember the verdict in the 
12 case? 
13 MR. LUDLOW: Guilty. 
14 THE COURT: Any else in the top row? All right. 
15 And then the back, I know we had Mr. Brown. 
16 MR. BROWN: Yes, it was a DUI case about five years 
17 ago. 
18 THE COURT: And do you remember the verdict in the 
19 case? 
20 MR. BROWN: It was guilty. 
21 THE COURT: Anyone else in the back row? It's Mr. 
22 Day - I'm sorry, Mr. Cressor. 
23 MR. DAY: Mr. Day. 
24 THE COURT: Oh, Day, okay. 
25 MR. DAY: It was a case in this court about two or 
14 
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three years ago. I do not recall the charges or anything. I 
recollect I believe the verdict was guilty. 
THE COURT: Anyone else that has served on a jury? 
Those of you that have answered in the affirmative, do you 
believe that you could be fair and impartial in this case and 
simply base the evidence - or base your decision on the 
evidence presented in this case and this case alone? If any 
of you would have difficulty being fair and impartial based 
on prior jury service, please raise your hand. The record 
will reflect that no hands are raised. 
It is the duty of the Judge, not the jury to 
determine punishment in the event the defendant is found 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Are there any of you who 
could not set aside the issue of punishment in your 
deliberations and base your decision of guilt or innocense 
solely on the facts presented? If any of your would let the 
issue of punishment affect your deliberation, please raise 
your hand. Again, the record will reflect that no hands are 
raised. 
Have any of you- formed an opinion as to the guilt 
or innocense of Mr. Harris or which party should prevail in 
this case? If so, please raise your hand. The record will 
reflect that no hands are raised. 
Have any of you been charged with the crime of 
assault, either simple assault or aggravated assault? If so, 
15 
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are raised. 
Have any of you been the victim of an assault, 
either domestic violence related or non-domestic violence? 
If so, please raise your hand. 
All right. Ms. Price, we'll start with you. How 
long ago? 
MS. PRICE: My ex-husband, five years ago., It was 
(inaudible) and get a restraining order against him but I 
never did. 
THE COURT: All right. The fact that you have been 
the victim of an assault and this case does involve issues of 
assault, would that give you some concern about your ability 
to be fair and impartial? 
MS. PRICE: It kind of would, yeah. 
THE COURT: Okay, and that's why we ask the 
question. So I appreciate your candor. Thank you, Ms. 
Price. 
All right. We also have another hand I believe in 
the jury box. That's Mr. Perry. 
MR. PERRY: I was car-jacked and assaulted in 
Minneapolis about 15 years, no, it would been 15 years ago. 
THE COURT: All right. This case will be a lot 
different than that. This involves a domestic situation. 
Would the fact that were a victim however of assault, would 
that give you any concern about your ability to be fair and 
17 
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impartial? 
MR. PERRY: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else in the jury box? All 
right, let's go to the back of the room. Anyone that's been 
the victim of assault? The record will reflect that no hands 
are raised. 
Do any of you have any close family members that 
have been the victim of an assault? If so, please raise your 
hand. All right, that's Ms. Ritter. 
MS. RITTER: My daughter. 
THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
MS. RITTER: Three days ago. 
THE COURT: Would that you concern about your 
ability to be fair and impartial? 
MS. RITTER: I hope not. 
THE COURT: I know these are hard things to look 
into your mind and try to anticipate what the evidence would 
be. The purpose of this voir dire selection process is to 
get jurors that can be completely fair and impartial. I know 
that it's difficult to kind of separate what happens in your 
private life when you come into court and sit on a jury but 
if you have any concern that, for example, your daughter's 
situation, you might relate that to this situation and 
somehow it would affect your decision then it's better that 
you not serve on this case and serve on another one. With 
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that in mind, do you have any concerns about your ability to 
be fair and impartial? 
MS. RITTER: I think I could be fair. 
THE COURT: Any question in your mind? 
MS. RITTER: Yeah, there is, there has to be. 
THE COURT: And that's why we ask the question and 
I appreciate your candor. 
Anyone else? All right. That's Mr. Berg. 
MR. BERG: My daughter while she was in high school 
(inaudible) assault from (inaudible). 
THE COURT: And how long ago was that? 
MR. BERG: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Would that situation have any bearing 
on your ability to be fair and impartial in this case? 
MR. BERG: No. 
THE COURT: Anyone else whose had a family member 
that's been the victim of an assault situation. 
Mr. Day? 
MR. DAY: Same one. 
THE COURT: And that would have no bearing? 
MR. DAY: No. 
THE COURT: All right. Obviously Ms. Serassio has 
identified to police officers who will testify. The law and 
direction from the Court is that you should consider the 
testimony of a law enforcement the same as you would consider 
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the testimony of any other witness. In other words, you 
should give the testimony of a peace officer no greater or 
lesser weight simply because of the position that they hold. 
You should consider their testimony the same as you would the 
testimony of any other witness. It could be a housewife, a 
teacher, a doctor, a salesman. It just simply doesn't 
matter. You have to judge their testimony as you would any 
other witness. 
Obviously sometimes in people's experiences they 
have had either negative or positive experience with law 
enforcement officers to the point that they would give either 
greater or lesser weight to their testimony. Do any of you 
feel that because of your experiences you would give either 
greater or lesser weight to the testimony of a witness simply 
because they hold the position of a peace officer? If so, 
please raise your hand. The record will reflect that no 
hands are raised. 
A couple of general questions. If you were a 
party, either the State of Utah or Mr. Harris, would you be 
fully satisfied to have your case tried by a person of your 
present attitude and frame of mind toward the case and that 
can be for any reason, you don't need to say it in front of 
everyone else. But is there anyone that has concerns in that 
area about if you were the State or the defendant about 
having your case tried by someone of your present attitude 
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and frame of mind? If you would have those concerns, please 
raise your hand. The record will reflect that no hands are 
raised. 
Do any of you have any personal considerations or 
concerns that may interfere with your ability to objectively 
sit and hear the evidence to be presented or to fairly and 
impartially consider the evidence, deliberate and render a 
verdict in this case? If you have any personal 
considerations or concerns, again, we can discuss those at 
the bench, but if you have those, please raise your hand. 
The record will reflect that no hands are raised. 
If you are selected to serve on this jury you will 
be called to sit in judgment of Mr. Harris. There is an old 
adage in Christian Law and Christianity and in the Bible that 
says something to the effect, judge not that ye be not 
judged. In this case you will take an oath to sit in 
judgment if you are selected on the jury. Are there any of 
your who would be uncomfortable and feel that you simply 
could not sit in judgment if called to serve on this jury? 
If so, please raise your hand. The record will reflect that 
no hands are raised. 
Counsel, please approach. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
THE COURT: Any questions I need to ask 
(inaudible)? 
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MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Obviously Ms. Price and Ms. Ritter. 
Anybody else? 
MR. (?).: Mr. Berg (inaudible) ask him questions 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: He said it was when she was in high 
school and it was just a boyfriend/girlfriend (inaudible). 
MR. (?): (Inaudible).-
THE COURT: I'll strike Ritter and Price. Let me 
do that right now and (inaudible). 
MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: All right. That concludes the voir 
dire. I'm going to have the attorneys exercise their 
peremptory challenges. 
While they're doing so, rather than just simply 
have you do nothing, I came across an article many, many 
years ago. It's by Barbara Holland, » | » 
article while we're waiting for the attorneys to exercise 
their challenges. 
It read as follows: "When law and order began, the 
only court was the head of the family and father knew best. 
His word was the law and there was no appeal. If papa was a 
bully, maybe momma could pack up the kids and move to a 
22 
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MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Obviously Ms. Price and Ms. Ritter. 
Anybody else? 
MR. (?).: Mr. Berg (inaudible) ask him questions 
[inaudible]. 
THE COURT: He said it was when she was in high 
school and it was just a boyfriend/girlfriend (inaudible). 
MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: I'll strike Ritter and Price. Let me 
do that right now and (inaudible). 
MR. (?): (Inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: All right. That concludes the voir 
dire. I'm going to have the attorneys exercise their 
peremptory challenges. 
While they're doing so, rather than just simply 
have you do nothing, I came across an article many, many 
years ago. It's by Barbara Holland, P i P M S P ^ S S ^ ^ S u 
article while we're waiting for the attorneys to exercise 
their challenges. 
It read as follows: "When law and order began, the 
only court was the head of the family and father knew best. 
His word was the law and there was no appeal. If papa was a 
bully, maybe momma could pack up the kids and move to a 
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different family or spike his soup with leaves and berries 
her mothet had told her about. In any case, what happened in 
the family was nobody's business but the family's. Presently 
people developed agricultural and settled down, clustering 
together in groups of families. We acquired garden plots and 
portable private property and controversy as we now know it 
was born. Old (inaudible) still decided family matters but 
coping with inner familiar strife called for group 
arbitration to prevent a homicidal free-for-all. Controversy 
gave birth to law. Rome refined the system and separated the 
law from the facts. A magistrate to find the dispute, cited 
the law and referred the problem to citizen (inaudible), a 
fellow of some standing who called in a few associates to 
help. They listened to the speeches, weighed the evidence 
and pronounced sentence. This was more orderly than a 
Tribunal. The Romans were passionately fond of order and 
wrote down all their laws in books. They were also fond of a 
good public spectacle and a convicted criminal could opt for 
the arena and entertain citizens by duking it out with other 
criminals or prisoners of war. A talented gladiator only got 
to live but he could wind up as a popular sports hero 
surrounded by pretty ladies. The Romans loved a winner 
regardless of his criminal record. 
After Rome fell apart it's orderly laws 
deteriorated to gibberish and threatened the possible 
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legendary King Arthur had to send his possible legendary 
knights out to ride around righting wrongs and rescuing 
maidens from sexual harassment, a far from comprehensive 
judicial system. There were still trials though with an 
ordeal serving as jury. Great faith has been placed in trial 
by ordeal all the way from the Old Testament to the 
Australian Outback. The idea is that something out there 
knows whose guilty and will point to him if given the chance. 
The chance usually involves fire or water or poison,, Poison 
is written in the Bible and was popular in Africa and India 
for trials by ordeal. Those who survived it all, though 
likely to be ill were considered to be innocent. 
The Saxons developed a variation called 
(inaudible), a morsel of something that would show if you're 
guilty, perhaps their throats were dry with apprehension and 
Godwin, Earl of Kent is said to have choked on his. Under 
Saxon law if you could carry several pounds of glowing, red, 
hot iron in your bare hands for nine steps or walk barefoot 
over nine red hot plowshares without getting any blisters, 
you were not guilty. 
Similar proof was accepted in Hindu and Scandinavia 
law. In Britain, Africa and parts of Asia plunging your arm 
into boiling water, oil, or lead without the usual results 
proved your innocense. Water was also knowledgeable stuff. 
The innocent sank, the guilty floated and could be fished out 
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and dealt with. This was the customary method of identifying 
witches who were cross tied, thumb to toe before being thrown 
in. True witches refused to drown and were dried off and 
burned at the stake. Alongside this unidentified jurist 
prudence, the Saxons were actually working with the human 
jury system but it was available only to the honest. If your 
neighbors knew you for a liar or you had perjured yourself in 
the past or presumably if you were a stranger just passing 
through, you weren't oath worthy and went directly to the 
red, hot iron or the drowning pond. But if you were a person 
of honesty in your district and were accused of a crime you 
swore by the Lord XVI am guiltless in both deed and counsel, 
of the charge of which yx' accuses me," and that was that. 
However, if you were accused by a group, you had to parry 
with a group of your own called compergators. You asked 11 
thanes, freeholders to join you and swear your honesty in the 
matter. If you couldn't round up 11 who believed you, you 
took off your shoes for the hot plowshares. 
In those days, honesty was the best policy. 
Honesty and a loyal group of bribable drinking buddies. 
(Inaudible) noticed this flaw provided for a group of 12 
senior thanes to investigate an act as an accusatory jury. 
Eight votes could convict. Justice was still a neighborhood 
matter. Everyone was suppose to know everyone else and have 
some firsthand knowledge -of what happened. 
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1 Rather recently we've turned this concept on its 
2 head and juries are suppose to know nothing at all before 
3 they sit down in the box, to be but empty vessels into which 
4 the liquor of admissible evidence is poured. In inflammatory 
5 cases a trial even gets moved to another area to insure jury 
6 indifference. 
7 When William the Conqueror took over England in 
8 1066 he left the. Saxon system in place and added some Norman 
9 forces like trial by combat. Combat was a judicial 
10 entertainment similar to the gladiatorial in which right was 
11 thought to make might. Whoever was right would win. The 
12 accuser had to do battle with the accused causing the small 
13 and frail to think twice before complaining. But if you were 
14 no good at fighting you could hire someone to fight for you. 
15 I The man with the fiercest hired help won rather like hiring 
16 the most expensive lawyer today. 
17 Ordeals fell into disuse in the 13th century but 
18 the right to trial by combat stayed on the books until 
19 Ashford vs. Thornton in 1819. By Norman times, laws were 
20 more complicated. So professionals called justice seers were 
21 sent around to keep an eye on the courts and rules of 
22 evidence rather like judges. They knew more about the law 
23 and less about what happened than the jurors did. 
24 We were told in school that jury trials sprang 
25 newborn from the Magna Carta, but juries were around before 
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1215. The Magna Carta just guaranteed them as a right not to 
be ignored by capricious powers like Bad King John. But some 
kings went right on being capricious anyway. 
In these enlightened times we merely torch the 
neighborhood if we don't like the verdict. But back then, 
juries got punished if the authorities didn't like it. Since 
juries were considered witnesses, a wrong vote was considered 
perjury. Acquitting' unpopular or possibly treasonous people 
got jurors hauled into the star chamber where a group of the 
King's dear friends dealt severely with them. They lost 
their goods and chattels and were sent to jail for at least a 
year. Sometimes their wife and children were thrown out of 
their house, the house demolished, the meadows destroyed and 
even the trees chopped down. A prudent jury weighed factors 
other than evidence. It was also the custom for the lawyer 
to pay each jurors several guineas or to take them all out to 
dinner. 
As we limped toward the 21st. century, the world 
community of nosy neighbors has faded into history and the 
problem now is who are these jurors? Prince Morgan called 
them wise men. Under Edward I, they were to be 12 of the 
better men of the bailiwick, under George IV, good and lawful 
men. Except for adulteresses, witches and common scolds, 
history doesn't mention women. Perhaps they're a recent 
invention. It seems to have been so simple then naming our 
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good, wise, lawful peers. How do we choose among strangers 
not necessarily wise but merely registered to vote? Once the 
blatantly prejudice have been sent packing, both sides take 
up the peremptory challenge of turning down jurors for the 
way they look, dress, or comb their hair. The differing 
agendas of the prosecution and the defense complicate 
matters. 
Prosecution lawyer, Jeffrey Tubin says that when he 
first came to the bar he was told to avoid men with beards, 
too independent and teachers and social workers, too 
sympathetic, and aim for the little old Lutheran lady in 
pearls, quick to judge and slow to forgive. 
For the defense, Clarence Darrow advised not to 
take a German, they are bull-headed; rarely take a Swede, 
they are stubborn. Always take an Irishman or a Jew, they 
are the easiest to move to emotional sympathy. He preferred 
old men for their tolerance, but Samuel Lee Woods liked them 
young for their still fresh sense of brotherhood and avoided 
self-made men, businessmen with close set eyes, writers, 
professors and former policemen. 
How are we doing? 
MS. SERASSIO: We're half done. 
THE COURT: Half done? Usually this is about when 
they get done. You'll just have to wait for a few minutes. 
Does anyone have any questions? I would tell you 
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that in a felony case, eight of you are called to serve on 
the jury. If this were a capital case involving the death 
penalty, it would be 12 of you. For a Class A Misdemeanor, 
six jurors and if it was a Class B Misdemeanor there would be 
four. So since this is a felony case, eight of you will be 
selected to serve on the jury and each attorney gets four 
peremptory challenges. So there will be eight of you that 
will be stricken. 
And for the record, Mr. McCaughey, you did pass the 
jury for cause? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: I think we need to approach for a 
minute. 
THE COURT: Okay, would you approach the bench? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Oh, we do pass for cause, yes. 
• THE COURT: And Ms. Serassio, you did pass the jury 
for cause? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yes.. 
THE COURT: Approach the bench. 
(Whereupon a sidebar was held as follows: 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: The concern (inaudible) is Juror 
No. 3 is struck by the State (inaudible) ability [inaudible] 
she needs to justify [inaudible]. 
THE COURT: All right, do you have a reason for 
that? 
MS. SERASSIO: Yeah, (inaudible). 
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THE COURT: Why don't we put that on the record 
during the break? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: Okay, I just wanted to inform you 
(inaudible). 
(End of sidebar) 
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to read the eight 
of you who have been selected to serve on the jury. As I 
read your name if you would please stand. Robert Lewis 
Merkley, Jason Howard Fullmer, Kathryn Ashley Van Roosendahl, 
Delvin Brent Norman, Jeffrey Eugene Perry, Sean Christopher 
Smith, David Randall Campbell, and Richard Allen Brown. 
Ms. Serassio, is that the jury you have selected? 
MS. SERASSIO: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. McCaughey? 
MR. MCCAUGHEY: It is, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Those of you that are standing, stay 
where you are. Those of you that are not standing, thank you 
for your appearance today. I am going to release you from 
jury service. You're welcome to remain as a spectator if you 
so choose. Otherwise, have the rest of a good day. 
(Prospective jurors not selected excused) 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Murphy, if I can get you 
to move down a few spaces. Mr. Fullmer, you're next to him, 
Ms. VanRoosendahl, I'll have you sit next to Mr. Fullmer and 
then Mr. Norman next to Ms. Van Roosendahl. 
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And then the back row, Mr. Perry will be at the far 
end. Next to Mr. Perry will be Mr. Smith and then Mr. 
Campbell and then Mr. Brown. 
All right. Before you get too comfortable, I'll 
have you stand and I'll have my clerk swear you in as jurors 
in this case. 
(Whereupon the jury members were sworn) 
THE COURT: All right. Let me just talk to you for 
a few minutes. Just sit down. It's important that you sit 
in the same order. It's probably best if you kind of move 
closer to the witness box so if you just kind of slide down. 
You don't need to do it now, just when you come back and I'm 
kind of tall so I like to spread out. You don't need to have 
every seat filled. If you want to put a seat between you, 
that's fine. Just be as comfortable as you can. We'll 
usually take at least one morning recess which we'll do now, 
at least one or two afternoon recesses. Sometimes it's based 
upon witness situations. If for any reason you feel like you 
need a recess, maybe you're just getting a little tired, 
maybe there's a telephone call that you need to make, maybe 
need to use the restroom facilities, all you have to do is 
just raise your hand and say, you know, Judge, can we take a 
recess? I won't ask you why but I want you alert and fresh. 
So don't feel at all embarrassed about asking for a recess. 
Sometimes I have a tendency to just kind of plow through and 
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